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Editor's Introduction 
THE NEO-KANTlAN READER aims to make accessi ble to the English-speaking reader a repre sentat ive selection of translations of primary read ings of the Neo-Kanlian tradition/ 
which is without a doubt the most broadly influential movement of European philosophy between 
approximately 1850 and 1918. 1 The Neo-Kantian Movement was inspired by the batt le cry 
" back to Kant/' mainly to counter scientific posit ivism and weltanschaulicli materiali sm in the 
mid-nineteenth century. 80th tendencies had entered the cu ltural mainstream and seemed to 
suggest an abolit ion of phi losophy altogether and a general decline of culture and its va lues. ' 
Coming after the so-called collapse of German Idealism and on the heels of the rampant scienlism, 
the Neo-Kantians wanted to revive the spirit of Kant by going back to Kant. Going back to Kant, 
however, meant \\going beyond" him. Going beyond the founder of the critica l method was 
motivated by the scien t ific and socia-political developments of the present, which necessitated, in 
turn, an updating of Kant's original posit ion in the light of these novel develop~ents. 
Soon after an openi ng era that is rather hard to character ize in its varied tendenc ies, two 
" power centers" emerged in Marburg and in Germany's Southwest (Freiburg and Heidelberg ), 
which brought forth such thinkers as Hermann Cohen, Pau l Natorp and Ernst Cassirer <the 
Marburg School) and Wilhelm Wi ndel band, Heinrich Rickert and Emil Lask <the Southwest 
or "Baden" School). The \\i mperial reign " (as Habermas once puts ill of Neo-Kanti anism in 
German-speaki ng areas lasted from approximately 1860 until 1Q18. In the interim period 
after the Great War, Neo-Kantianism became identified as a staid, conservative philosophy 
that was attached, both intellectually as well as philosophically, to the German Kaiserreich and 
its stale values. Neo-Kantianism remained the philosophical paradigm dur ing the 1920s, while 
newer movements such as phenomenology ascended." Its fi nal deathblow occurred in 1933, 
when the last living representatives of an erstwhile domineering phi losophical commun ity were 
forced to leave Germany. 
The readings selected here offer a representative selection of these thinkers. The cho ice of 
read ings is intended to lead the reader through the main stages in the development of Neo-
Kantianism. The selections are taken from the key works of the Neo-Kantian philosqphers, 
starting from the polymath Heinrich Helmholtz to arguably the last Neo-Kantian, Ernst 
Cassirer, who died in 1 Q45, though debates about when exactly Neo-Kantianism began and 
ended will no doubt continue. 
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• Classical Neo-Kantianism: Attempt at a Brief Definition 
What is Neo-Kantianism? Who are the Neo-Kantians? Let us begin with a brief (attempt at a) 
definiti on of Neo-Kantianism. In t rivial terms, Neo-Kantianism is a philosophy that attempts 
to revive ~ant 's philosophy. Immediately, several questions may ensue. What is Kant's 
philosophy about? Why would his ph ilosophy be in need of a revival? What does it mean to 
revive Kant's philosophy? It is fair to say that with in the group of thinkers whom nineteenth-
and twentieth-century histor iography ' has grouped, somewhat randomly, into this category, 
these V:Je re the questions that were debated. But it is also clear that there were then, and are 
now, no unified answers to these questions. Indeed, the entire Neo-Kantian movement can be 
seen as discussing and emphatically disagreeing on possible answers to these (and other> 
questions. Even the term Neo-Kantianism was contested. As in most -isms, one needs to bear 
in mind that it is, fo r the most part, a label appended to these th inkers by others, mostly critics. 
Seen in th is light, many of those whom we consider staunchly embedded in the Neo-Kant ian 
movement, did not see themselves as furthering !(ant's philosophy at all, and they would have 
rejected this label outr ight. Other titles were used by representatives we now group under the 
label Neo-Kantianism; some other t itl es were ( Neo-)Cri tic ism, value theory (or va lue-
theoretical philosophy), and others. Other labe ls were used by the bystanders, for instance, 
Neo-Fichtean ism. With in the Neo-Kant ian movement there were at least two different "camps" 
(in Marburg an,d the Southwest>, not to mention isolated "satellites," who disagreed on their 
. interpretations of Kant and stood fo r very different phil osoph ical directions. 
Given the I'imperial reign" of Neo-Kantian phi losophers, it is perhaps best to call the 
period between approximately 1860 and 1918, in terms of ph ilosophical historiography, the 
age or era of Neo-Kantianism. Its representatives were the most important thinkers of their 
day, both wi thi.n academia and in terms of admiration bestowed upon them by a learned public, 
the German Bildung5bu~gertum, who adored their 'I Mandarins," to use a term famously coined 
by Fritz Ringer to describe the German professoriate, with almost rel igious devotion. 
Often slandered as II Professorenphifosophie" or II Kathederphi/o50phie" ("phi losophers' 
philosophy" or " lectern ph ilosophy"), one formally defining, albeit completely extraneous, 
trait of Neo-Kantianism deserves to be emphasized. All Neo-Kantians were academics, Le., 
they held posi tions of some sort with in German academia {un like the academic fa il ures, 
intentionally or not, such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Marx, or KierkegaardL As such, the 
Neo-Kanti ans were quite successful career philosophers who were in fluent ial within higher 
,education in Germany and beyond, for instance in poli tical debates of the day, and they were 
altogether quite comfortable in their bourgeois setti ng. 5 In this capacity, they influenced and in 
some cases defined academic politi cs (esp. with respect to philosophy) at universities guided by 
the Humboldtian ideal (the un ity of research and teaching). In th is sense, a defining feature of 
the Neo-Kantians was certain ly the image of the typical academic of the nineteenth century: 
male (on this more below), bespectacled, with impressive beards and gold-chained pocket 
watches adorni ng their equally impressive midsections. As Mandarins, they preached their 
philosophies from the lectern with a stern Teuton ic demeanor.b In hindsight, they appear as 
ultra-conservative defenders of the German Kaiserreich, despite the fact that politically, most 
of them were left-leaning li berals and soc ialists (or perhaps better, ~'social - idealists"). 
Thus, despite this formal commonality, when we speak of " Neo-Kantianism" and "the Neo-
Kantians" today, the current reader should be aware that one is deal ing with anything but a 
unified school or a unified group of philosophers who have some sense of agreement amongst 
themselves as to what they-stand for. On the other hand, their strongho ld in the academic (not 
j ust ph ilosophical) scene of the ir t ime was hard-earned and not aCCidental; thus, what the reader 
can expect is a plet~ora of extremely interesting, original, and thought-provoking material that 
has relevance for today as well. Wh~n people nowadays use the term \\ Neo-Kanti ans" and mean 
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Christine Korsgaard or JOrgen Habermas, they should be aware that this practi ce has a tradition 
reaching back some one hundred years, in that Husserl or Heidegger referred to their 
contemporaries in the same way. For the intellectual development of European thought in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centur ies, an understanding of the positions and figures of Neo~ 
Kantianism is close to being indispensable for understanding the transition from German Idealism 
to nineteenth-century scientific posi tivism to pheno~enologYI existentialism, hermeneutics, 
logical positivism, and beyond. Having been almost completely neglected for some half century, 
the Neo-Kan.tians are the great missing link in th is historical trajectory. Nobody who wants to 
cla im acquaintance with the history of modern philosophy and Western intellectual history can 
dispense with at least a certain amount of knowledge of this period and its thinkers. This 
anthology should be able to supply an init ial introduction to this body of knowledge. 
In the foll owing, I will trace, in briefest terms, the developmental stages of Neo-Kantianism 
to give the present reader a certain historical map' to orient herself (ct. also the timel ine see 
pages ix-xvii l. 
Earl y History (1845- 1871 ) 
The stages of Neo-Kantianism are certainly debated and that is a good thing, as different 
perspectives will order the stages differently . Given the text se lections of th is Reader, I have 
opted to call this period, ranging somewhere from 1845- 1871, the "early history" of Neo-
Kantianism. This early period is bookended on the one side by Helmho ltz 's early texts and, on 
the other, by the publication of Cohen's first edit ion of Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871) , 
which ushers in the Aowering of the two schools in Marburg and the Southwest. 
Prior to, and concurren t with, th is period fall the writings of late Idealists or early Ne.o-
Kantians, depending on how one wants to label them (figures such as the younger Fichte, Fr ies, 
HerbarO, though I have chosen to extend this period to include Helmho ltz, Liebmann, Lange, 
and Lotze. Espec ially the inclusion of Lotze in this group of th inkers shows how debatable 
these decisions are. Lotze is certa inly not philosophical ly close to Liebmann a'nd Lange, though 
he clearly has had an enormous influence on the Southwest School's theory of value. Liebmann 
and Lange certain ly belong to the group of outspoken Neo*Kantians, wi th Liebmann's battle 
cry of " back to Kant" resonating wi th many th inkers at the t ime, and with Lange serv ing as the 
first Neo-Kantian professor in phil osophy at the University of Marburg and being responsible 
. for the contentious hir ing of Cohen, a Jew, as his successor. 
P!,)ilosophicall y, this early period is marked by a speCifically naturalistic or psychologistic 
reading of Kant, especia lly in Helmholtz and the early Cohen, who publi shed his first writings 
in the Zeitschrift fur Vijlkerpsycholog ie und Sprachwissenschaft (Journal for Folk Psychology 
and Linguistics), a journal that offers ( in the words of Edgar), \\an anthropological investigation 
of the orig ins of cultural products such as art and Iiterature'l7 . A common interpretation of 
Kant involved the rejection of the synthetic a priori in favor of a naturalistic interpretation of 
anthropological commonali t ies, such that one can speak of this first period as a physiological 
Kantianism. This characterization of the per iod is supported by the fact that it is a common 
trait in the transition to the fl owering of the Neo-Kantian movement that the vast majority of 
major Neo-Kant ians (with the exception, perhaps, of Alois Riehl ) went on to reject any 
phYSiological or naturalistic Kant interpretati~~ as constitut ing a retreat into subjectivism or 
psychologism. Indeed, Cohen came into his own, one can say, through a radically anti -
subjectivistic reading of Kant in his 1871 Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, a reading that will 
become only stronger in subsequent editions. L ikewise, the texts selected from Lange, 
Liebmann, and Lotze are already a reaction to the physiological interpretation of Kant that 
they encountered in the writings of their contemporaries. Thus, one can speak of "Neo-
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• J<antianism" in a more substantial sense of the term as the rejection of a psychologislic Kant 
interpretation, which thinkers such as Helmholtz found attractive, and as the, only way one 
could remain a \\KantianO in light of the current developments in the sciences. 
Flowering (1871-1914). The Formation ofthe Two Schools in 
Marburg and the Southwest 
The la~ter quarter of the nineteenth century is without doubt the era of Neo-Kantianism, in the 
sense that it had established a stronghold in professional and academic philosophy. This era 
lasted until the beginning of the Great War. The two emerging power centers were in Marburg 
and the Southwest. Let us begin with the Marburg School. 
The Marburg School, as a school with a distinct phi losophical orientation, began 
histbrically with Cohen's arrival in Marburg in 1873 and his assumption of the chair left 
vacant by Lange's death in 1876. As already suggested, arranging for the Jewish Cohen to 
assume this professorship was quite the "coup II at the time, in light of the more or less open 
anti-Semitism in German academia. He was joined by Natorp in 1881, who first worked in the 
university library, assuming a professorship in 1893 (dedicated to philosophy and also 
pedagogy). The two can be seen as the Iltwin stars" of the Marburg School, exerting a wide-
ranging influen~e in Marburg and beyond. The term II Marburg School" became an established 
· term in German-speaking academia around 1900, where the idea of a school establishment 
(Schulbildung) was very much part of the philosophical "profile." This meant that there was a 
clear distinction between Cohen, who was the undisputed (intellectual as well as emotional) 
leader of the school, and Natorp, as the undisputed "second in command,"B surrounded by a 
group of young novices whose task was to "sign on" and carry further the banner of the school 
after their teachers' demise. 9 Ernst Cassirer was nel1er a novice in this sense and was more of 
a distant. satellite, though philosophically he can be seen as part of the Marburg School. The 
school's bloom was between 1900 and 1910, with some crises between then and the beginning 
of the Great War. In 1918, Cohen left Marburg to live in Berlin, while Natorp w.as left to fend 
for himself. Once Heidegger came to Marburg in 1922, the fox was in the chicken coop, so to 
speak, though it speaks to Natorp's honesty that he was in favor of Heidegger's move to 
Marburg. Natorp died in 1924 and left no students behind; none at least who would have been 
able to carryon the school tradition. In 1929, after the famous Davos Dispute between Cassirer 
· and Heidegger, it was the general impression that Neo-Kantianism in the form of the Marburg 
School had been "finished off." In 1933, Cassirer left Germany altogether and the last 
remnants of the Marburg School had been all but obliterated. 
Philosophically, the school can be subsumed under two key notions: the "transcendental 
method II as the general method utilized by the school, and the overall project of a philosophy 
of culture. The transcendental method was the method of starting out from a factum to begin 
the work of transcendental philosophy (following the analytiC method Kant had used in the 
Prolegomena) , with the important addition that this factum had to be the factum of science 
(das Faktum der Wissenschaft>. Thus was Cohen's readi ng of Kant's first Critique: the notion 
of experience Kant had in mind was the experience of modern sCi.entists, who "experience" 
nature not as a brute fact, but as obeying and standing under mathematical-physical laws. 
Hence, the transcendental method had to inquire into the conditions of the possibility of this 
Newtonian physical science, not as a psychological or historical investigation, but as an inquiry 
into the conceptual work that is underway as science produces its results, which are laws and 
concepts. This was th.e main "work " on the part of the Marburg School and it had its greatest 
impact here. It is .for this reason that the Marburg School had come to be identified with 
critica l or transcendental philosop.hy of science. 
xxiv EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
The second hal lmark of th is school - namely, its project of developing a ph ilosophy of 
cu lture - is extremely misleading in l ight of the Marburg School 's sel f -interpretationl although 
the overall reception of this school as offering mainly a theory of natural science might, in the 
end, be just ified. For the overall goal of the School was to apply the transcendental method to 
all spheres of culture, fo llowing Kant 's canonical dist inction between logic,· ethics, and 
aesthetics. Accordingly, the transcendental method had to be applied to each respective factum 
of science of each cul tura l sphere, and so to morali ty (legality) and aesthetics, in addition to 
science and C09nition. 10 Thus, the ambition was to account philosophically for each part of 
reality that is created by the human being and according to the latter 's creative capaci t ies, in 
short, for culture writ large. It might seem obvious that a philosophy of .culture that began with 
the different facta of the sciences - for example, in Cohen's system, with jurisprudence as the 
science of eth ics, and wi th art history as the science of aesthetics - could be conceived as 
problematic by their contemporaries, and it was "for this reason that the Marburg School 's 
ambition beyond logic and theory of cognition was fo r the most part ignored. When Cassirer 
famously declares in Volume I of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms that " the cri tique of 
reason turns into the cri tique of cu lture," he was echoing the basic stance of his teachers, yet 
his success as a philosopher of culture lay, arguably, in his making a decisive break with the 
transcendenta l method as it had been conceived and pract iced by Cohen and Natorp. 
Other areas of work in the Marburg School included Natorp's wri t ings on psychology, 
whose main influence lay in pav ing the way for H usserl 's later phenomeno logy in a transcendental 
register, and Natorp's works in social and pedagogical ph ilosophy, which all stood under the 
banner of " idealism" (hence "Social-Idealism" and "Social Pedagogy ">' 
The Southwest School derived its name from its locations in Freiburg and Heidelberg, in 
the southwest of Germany, a two-hour train ride apart . Because it was located in the State of 
Baden (which was combined with Wurttemberg after World War II, to form the Stat~ of 
Baden-Wurttemberg ), it was also called the Baden School of Neo-Kantianism. Due to its 
philosophical orientation, it was ca lled - to contrast wi th the "cri tici sm" of the Marburgers-
the \'va lue-theoret ical" (werttheoretische) school of Neo-Kantianism. Its first representative 
- not quite wi th the nimbus of Cohen - was Windelband, who taught first at ·Freiburg and later 
(with stops in between) in Heidelberg. His most famous pupil was Rickert, who succeeded 
Windelband both in Freiburg and later, after Windelband's death, in Heidelberg. Though 
arguably more or iginal and profound than Windelband, Rickert attracted fewer students due 
to a psychological impairment (agoraphobia>. The " poster child" of the Southwest School was 
the younger Lask, whose premature death in the trenches of the Great War certa inly hel ped to 
enshrine him in the pantheon of geniuses who died young. Lask was by al l accounts an orig inal 
thinker who took his philosophy in a more radical direct ion than his teachers, though, not 
having attained a professorsh ip at the time of his death, was seen as academically dependent 
on Rickert (as well as Max Weber) in Heide lberg. 
The overall philosophical tendency of the Southwest School is rightfully indicated wi th the 
term "value theory. " Its philosophical predecessor is clearly Lotze in his " transcendental" 
reading of the Platonic theory of the Forms, which are more aptly to be described in their 
ontological status as "validities." It is in this " third real m" that values are to be located. Once 
again reject ing a psychologist ic in terpretat ion of ideal entit ies, such a reading was to be 
utilized as a bulwark against the threatening moral relat ivism that had been diagnosed, 
famously, by Nietzsche in his trope of the de~th of God. Thus, as a universal value theory, the 
Southwest interpretation was, like the Marburg School though with some decisive differences, 
to culminate in a philosophy of culture. In addition to a theory of values, the Southwesterners 
contributed to the general discussion at the t ime (especially in critica l discussion with Di lthey) 
surroundi ng the theory of (val ue-free) natural sciences and (value-laden) Geisteswissenschaften, 
i.e., the human or cul tura l sciences. This latter concern grew organically out of thei r concern 
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,with va lues, since it is the human sciences that deal wi th cultural va lues. Cr it ically rejecting 
Dilthey's distinction between natural sciences as explanatory and the human sciences as 
interpretive, Windelband famously called for a methodological distinction' between two 
different ways of attending to the object of cognition, either by way of sing ling out its 
individua lities or seeing the individual object as a representative of universal laws (idiographic 
versuS nomothet ic sciencesl. Rickert's theo ry concerning the object of cognition is a more 
ambitious theory based on Windelband's more innocuous distinction. Nevertheless, with the 
focus on a theory of val ues in- conjunction wi th the methodolog ical distinction between 
individualistic and general sciences, the Southwest School displays thereby a distinctive profile 
vis-a-vis the Marburg School and other competing attempts at grasping the distinct character 
of the non-natural sciences, and thereby defending the status of philosophy itself. Lask took the 
latter problem into a new dimension when he set out to write a logic of phi losophy itself and its 
sui generis doctrine of categor ies. 
Decline and Late Neo-Kantianism 
The decline of the late Neo-Kantian movement can most appropriately be told from the 
perspective of those who constructed for themselves, as Crowell puts it (quoted in note 4), a 
" l iberation n ~~rative,1I which would consist in calling out the shortcomings and mistakes on 
the part of the Neo-Kantians. Th is story can be best left to the heirs of the ini t ial liberators. 
But from the perspective of the Neo-Kantian establishment, it was obvious that there were 
hardly any successors left after the Great War and that the remaining Neo-Kantians had a 
rather pessimistic view of the future of their movement. For instance, Heidegger, who had been 
a promising student of Rickert's, soon came under the sway of the phenomenologist Husserl 
and abandoned the ship. In Marburg, there were no pupils left who had the power to gain 
larger-scale influence1f, and with the two power centers coming apart, the scattered Neo-
Kantians left (in places such as Munich or Gtittingen) were not able to sustain school unity or 
a unified movement. Too strong were the novel philosophical forces that began ~hipping away 
at the foundations of what was once a Continent-wide movement. The Great War, which did 
away not only with Germany's political hegemony in Europe but its val ues and morals as wel l, 
is not to be overloo"ked in doing its part in Neo-Kantianism's demise. Indeed, in hindSight, the 
new crop of students flocking to the universities and attempting to find grounding in 
philosophical thought, were utterly disapPointed by the seemingly empty gestures of the 
remaining Neo-Kantians. That some of them had been enthusiastic supporters of the Great 
War, such as Natorp, certainly did not help the movement. Hence, the Neo-Kantians who 
remained to carry its banner forward were perceived as backward-looking and incapable of 
providing any remedy to the rampant Ilcrisis" all around. Not only were they incapable of 
providing help; worse, they were perceived as part of the old system that was held accountable 
for the catastrophe of the Great War and its devastating aftermath. 
Th.us, the interwar period has little to offer to the philosophical historian of Neo-
Kantianism (though it is a most fru itful period for the historian of phenomenology). It was 
populated by (mostly second-rate) pupils of the great names, who ~ave more or less rightfully 
been forgotten. The history of this short period is beset by pol itical infighting, as detailed, in 
the case of Marburg, by Sieg, where the themes discussed can only be understood in historical 
hindsight. For instance, the ski rm ishes fought vehemently between IIAryan" and Jewish 
representat ives of Neo-Kantianism - ridiculous debates over whether Jews could adequately 
understand Kant and. could consequently be counted as part of the German cultura l heritage -
are uncannily pres~ient looking ba~k at this period knowing what happened in Germany as of 
1933. 
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The great schism came in 1933, when many Jews left Germany, among them many 
philosophers who had some relation to the Neo-Kantians (such as Cassirer or Honigswald), and 
most philosophers remain ing in Germany were either incapable of resisting the national-
socialist \'pull/' or, in the case of Heidegger, actively furthered it. It is, in th is context, not 
surprising that Neo-Kantianism came to be identified and vilified by many Nazi !'philosophers" 
as a philosophy of the Kaiserreich, both degenerate and inherently I'Jewish" in its substance. 
But apart from the unfair identification of \\ Neo-Kantian" and "Jewish,'1 it would be indeed an 
unwritten chapter of the philosophy of the twentieth century, which, were one to speculate on 
how it might have been written, would have had to assess what would have happened to the 
Neo-Kantian movement had someone like Ca'ssi rer lived some more years in the US and 
established a fo llowing. It perhaps would have completely re-shaped the philosophy of the 
second half of the twentieth century, had some Neo-Kantians prevailed in the New World after 
being driven from the European cont inent. As if was, Neo-Kantianism was dead in Europe, 
never caught on in the New World, whereas others who fled, such as Strauss, Arendt, Carnap 
and others, went on to become extremely influential, and the only philosopher to speak of who 
remained standing in Germany was HeideggerY Imagining what could have happened had 
history played itself out differently is speculation, of course, but such speculat ion may be 
permitted a century after Neo-Kantiani sm's peak. 
Reception and Legacy 
Especially after their demise, the reception of Neo-Kant ianism was for the most part cri tical 
and even destructive. It became fashionable to pit one 's own attempts against the backdrop of 
Neo-Kantianism. This is especial ly true for the budding Phenomenological Movement, ~hose 
defining characteristic - "to the things themselves! " (not " back to Kant") - is a battle cry 
directed, in crit ical rejection, at the Neo-Kantian obsession wi th "empty speculation" and "ego 
metaphysics. II The emphasis on the role of the subject and the individual and her existence is a 
direct reaction to the "I ogicist" position of the Marburg School and the Southwest theory of 
values, which seem to float in some heaven inaccessible to the individual. More recent research 
reveals that this " dialectical" image of the new emerging ph ilosophj~s, as negating in different 
ways the posi t ion of the Neo-Kantians, is certainly exaggerated and can only be understood in 
hindSight, and much more work must be done to fu lly uncover the many filiations and overlaps 
between the Neo-Kantians and their contemporariesY 
. As for the legacy of Neo-Kantian ism, it would lead too far afie ld to spell this out here l4 , 
but it bears mentioning that Kant scholarship in the twentieth century, including in the Anglo-
American world, would have been impossible without the prior work done by the classical Neo-
Kantians. If one defining project, among others, of Neo-Kant ian ism was its project of a 
philosophy of culture, then one must emphasize that today 's cu ltura l studies, both empirical as 
well as philosophical, owe a great deal to the Neo-Kant ians. Final ly, today's philosophy of 
science has discovered the interest ing approaches especially of the Marburg School. 
Contemporary history of science has also come to the realization that the Neo-Kantian era is a 
nearly untapped reSource for its work. Moreover, the theory of ph ilosoph ical historiography 
has, as of late, sparked newer reflections. ~~rhaps reflecting a weariness with the many forms 
and shapes of contemporary historiography (history of effects, history of reception, postmodern 
subversive historiography etc'), there is a growing interest today in the time-honored history-
of -problems approach (Problemgeschichte) that was developed, practiced, and executed with 
high historical fidelity and sensi t ivity by most Neo-Kantians. Finally, an important· debate at 
the time, in which the Neo-Kantians were involved, was over the status and methodology of the 
cultural or human sciences vis-a.-vis the natural sciences, predating the famous debate regarding 
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.the "two cultures. II In light of current debates over the humanities, the dialogue between the 
" two culturesll defini n9 academia, and the overall project of naturalizing everything "spiri tual " 
or \'mental/' the Neo-Kantians developed a whole arsenal of arguments and ~iews on these 
issues, wh ich will be interesting for the philosophical historian as well as theorists of sc ience 
and the philosopher of mind. 
One further issue deserves mentioning, especially in l eday's climate: namely, the absence 
of women in Neo-Kantianism. There are no women represented in this entire movement. 
Indeed, one feature that made newer philosophical movements attractive, especially 
pheno:nenology, was that they actively we lcomed women into their circles. Indeed, women 
abounded in phenomenological circles, even to ·the extent that it i rritated the tradi t ional 
founding father, Edmund Husserl. 15 
Organization of this Volume 
There are several ways in which one can present historical material of this sort, which are most 
likely equally justifiable. To list a few (non-exhausti ve) opt ions: 
One could make a selection topically, that is, based on certain philosophical canonical 
topics, ?uch as epistemology, moral philosophy, soc ial and polit ical philosophy, 
aesthetics. A lthough many Neo- Kantians thought along these canonical divisions, the 
reason I have refrained from th is organization is that selec ting texts in this manner 
would have obscured the manner in which these th inkers themselves wished to present 
their work. Many of the conceptua l and systemat ic dist inctions they employ make it 
clear that these canonical divisions do not work for their system, or that they want to 
overcome, modify or subvert them. 
Another would be an organization according to problems and di scussions at the time 
when the Neo-Kantians li ved. Thus, following Be iser's latest presentation of "philosophy 
after Hegel, " one could present the main discussions at the time, such as the materialism 
controversy and the ignorabimus debate, and select texts in which the Neo-Kantians 
contributed and reacted to them. The drawback here is that it would obscure the 
" positive" and original work, the systemat ic intentions, on the part of the Neo-Kantians 
and would present them Simply as making contributions, among other intellectuals from 
other schools or outside of academia altogether, to these ongoing debates. They would 
be perceived as simply a voice within a larger chair. That historically this might have 
been the way the Neo-Kant ians were heard is uncontested. The reason I have not opted 
for th is principle of organization is due mainly to the fact that it would not have allowed 
the Neo-Kantians' posit ive contributions to come fully to the fore . 
The principle here was to select texts in tempora/succession and according to Schools. 
Accord ingly, the two ma in sections, II and III, feature a selection of the main members 
of the two schools in Marburg and Southwest Germany, respect ively. The advantage was 
that in this way the two "blocks" could be most clearly discerned in their styles and 
intentions. Cohen and Natorp in Marburg, and Windelband. and Rickert in Southwest 
Germany, not only collaborated especially closely, their philosophical contributions are 
not understandable without their partners. Moreover, the school s also saw themselves in 
compet ition, such that a great portion of their work is tacitly or overtly directed at the ir 
opponents in the other "camp, " This way of presentation may certa inly be contested in 
light of the t'lo(o other options listed above, but so be it. Ideally, of course, the texts 
presented he.re wi II be read wi ,th a deep appreciation of the philosophical canon, especially 
since its reconception in Kant, and with a sensitivity to historical context. 
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Philological Note to the Present Selection 
In laking on this project, I thought it would be a fairly easy job. After all, aIH!) one had to do 
is select the re levant texts, scan them, write little introductions, et voila. The reality of the 
project has proven to be much different and indeed more difficult than I antiCipated, and 
completing this Reader has been, mehercle, a daunting job that has taken far too long. Indeed, 
over the years, I have received many queries as to when the book would final ly be on the 
market, and all I could say was that the project was delayed for many reasons, some out of my 
control, some within my control , but impossi ble to get around. Thus, in finally present ing the 
public with this textbook, I apologize to all for iis delay. I hope that the old ·German saying 
Was lange wahrt, wird endfich gut [Long in coming, but worth the wait] may be true of this 
project as well. 
Not to list further excuses, but to give scholars1willing to enter this area a sense of what 
they are in for and what future work awaits them, a few words of explanation are in order 
regarding the situation in which I found myself in undertaking this anthology. There is no doubt 
that the whole area cal led II Neo-Kantianism" is, for various reasons, one big II mess. II Let us 
begin with the situation in German scholarship. First, as explained above, it is not clear what 
exactly Neo-Kantianism is and which philosophers or scientists fall under it. In many cases, the 
"-ism" su ffi x is intended to denigrate or critique an author. Th is is no different with respect to 
the label II Neo-Kantianism. " Hence, identifying who exact ly counts as a Neo-Kantian requires 
historical and philosophical judgment that mayor may not be entirely fair with respect to a 
certain author. Hence, certain decisions had to be made, some of which were purely pragmatic 
and which may meet with approval or not, but so be it. When it comes to this area of philosophy, 
it is impossible to satisfy everyone. 
Philologically, the situation is made worse by t he sheer output on the part of the Neo-
Kantians. Not only did they write entire books at the pace by which normal scholars today 
produce articles; also, it was common at the t ime to re-edi t one 's own previous books, but in 
re-editing them also part ially to re-write them, noting more recent scholarship and commenting 
on the latter while revisi ng one's own text, all the while revisi ng one 's very own position (cf., 
for instance, Natorp's IIMetacr itique" of his book on Plato, which nearly reverses his earlier 
position). Hence, to get a clear line on any philosopher 's trajectory is nearly impossible to 
achieve, given the additional fact that of the, say, five editions a book has received, not all are 
available any longer in libraries. Thus, part of the reconstruction of this historical situation is 
guesswork at best or would require extensive research in university archives. 
Th.e si tuation becomes even worse when one looks at the situation on the side of the 
English language. Translations of Neo-Kantians are scarce and their quality very uneven. 
Some Neo-Kantians have been translated well - not always those one wou ld recognize as 
standing out today, but important and popular at the time, such as Vaihinger. Of others, 
nothing or nearly nothing has been translated, or else only tangential pieces, as in the case of 
Cohen and Lask. Of the existing translations, figuring out exactly which edition of the German 
was translated has been an additional challenge. And of these existing translations, the quality 
of them varies greatly, including the manner in which they dealt wi th the scholarship cited by 
the original (again, some translated, some notL I tried to render the texts in as unified a way 
as possible, since the dates of translation (and accordingly standards of philological rigor) lay 
wide apart. I have also added some (hopefully h~lpful) footnotes, which, however, I attempted 
to keep to a minimum, sticking to the maxim that what I was producing was a Reader, not a 
critica l edition (as much as the latter may be necessary>. Although it might have been desirable, 
it was impossible to redo the older translations without further delaying publicat ion. Most of 
them are good, even excellent, esp. in capturing the tone of voice of the philosophers of the 
Wilhelmian era; some, however, leave much to be desired. But in the hopes of givi ng a fair 
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presentation of the individual philosophers, I have had to " bite the bullet" when it came to 
using existing-though perhaps questionable translations, rather than omitting ill}portant texts. 
However, I did not content myself wi th just repr inting older and exist ing translations, 
since this would have rendered this Reader a collection that completely misrepresents the 
phi lologica! as well as philosophical situation. Instead, I had to commission new translations 
to deliver a more well-rounded image of the Neo-Kantian movement. Though the translators 
have done admirable work, I did have to go through each new translation several times and 
consult with the respective translators' to ensure consistency. 
It. is my hope that the resu lt will prove satisfactory; yet, the texts produced here will not 
and cannot replace a study of the original German; nor is this collection in any way a complete 
rendering of the Neo*Kantian movement. ·Indeed, what [ was able to select from existing 
translations and in addition managed to get translated represents, of course, only a snippet of 
the works of these philosophers. In the case where little or nothing was translated so far, I tried 
to make an even*handed selection (e.g., Cohen, with the help of Hyder and Patton 1b ). In the 
case where a good amount of works has been translated, e.g., Cassirer (though the existing 
older translations leave much to be desired as well), I tr ied to pick texts that move off the 
beaten path, 17 
The resulting bottom line is that, after many years of research in this area, this Reader 
can only be a start for further wor k that will have to be carried out by others. Far from an 
Edit io Critica, I, would like to refer to it as an Editio Minima, with the intention of pointing the 
. reader to where more can be found. It is my hope that this Reader will not only be received wi th 
charity, as merely a first stab at this nearly untapped area of European philosophical history, 
but that a novel wave of in terest in the Neo*Kantians will ensue wi th in English*speaking 
scholarship, which will finally give the Neo*Kantian movement - a movement more vi lified and 
slandered than perhaps any other in the history of modern philosophy - its full due. To the 
percept ive eye, this is .a philosophical movement rich in innovative and original thought, 
profound in its scholarship, and vast in its scope. 
A note of thanks goes to the fo llowing people: 
Special than ks go to Tony Bruce from Routledge for commissioning this project, and for 
having the patience" and confidence in me to complete this Reader. It has been long in the 
making and long overdue, and has suffered several setbacks. For this I apologize to him and to 
,all those who have been waiting for me to finish it. I thank Adam Johnson at Routledge for 
shepherding this volume through from beginning to end, including all the little things involved 
in such a venture, such as rights, scanning, and so on. I also thank Peter Murray, my capyeditor 
at Routledge, for his swift and attentive work. 
This Reader could also not have been possible without the constant input and help from a 
number of people. I would like to thank the following scholars who have helped me in the 
selection of texts and, in some cases, in wri t ing the introductory texts: Michael Friedman, 
David Hyder, Lydia Patton, and Andrea Stai ti. Michael Friedman, David Hyder, and Lydia 
Patton were also involved, partly or wholly, in t ranslating some hitherto untranslated pieces, 
in addition to the other translators, Elizabeth Behnke (H usser[), Frat:lces Bottenberg ( Natorp), 
Jon Burmeister (Rickert), Brian Chance ( Lange), Alan Duncan (Windelband), and Arun Iyer 
(LaskL Other scholars who have helped me with their expertise in making my final editorial 
decisions were Frederick Bei ser, Steven Crowel l, Scott Edgar, Massimo Ferrari , Peter E. 
Gordon, Helmut Holzhey, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Dermot Moran, Guy Oakes, and Ulrich Sieg. 
Research Assistants at Marquette University who have worked hard in helping me assemble 
material and proofr.ead were: Kimberly Engels, Dana Fritz, Matthew Zdon, and Clark Wolf. I 
owe them, too, a great amount of gr~titude . Finally, I thank the participants in my undergraduate 
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seminar "nineteenth Century German Philosophy" in the Fall of 2014 at Marquette University, 
who were the fi rst brave readers of the texts of this volume. [t is, in cloSing, my hope that the 
way courses such as th is one will be taught will be changed through the availability of English 
translations of philosophers who were the domi nant voices in phi losophy in the nineteenth 
century. 
Notes 
Milwaukee, Eall of 2014 
Sebastian Luft 
1 A previous plan was t o include a selection of French Neo~Kantians, but this would have 
exploded the confines of the present selection, both thematically as well as in length. A 
selection of French Neo-Kantian texts can be found in The Philosophical Forum of 2006 
07D]>' 
2 II We ltanschauung" is the term for a wor ldview, oftentimes ideologica lly charged. 
3 There are different time lines and different narratives by which one can define classical Neo-
Kantianism. Cf. especially the work by Beiser on this movement, but d. also Crowell }C~98 
and Friedmann 2000. The narrat ive given here is meant to be as open and inclusive as 
possible. The purpose of this col lection and its introduction is not to steer interpretations in 
any particular direction, but rather to make this material available to the English-speaking 
reader. 
4 As Crowel l aptly puts it, regarding this interwar period, the treatment of Neo-Kantianism 
becomes part of "liberat ion narratives" (Crowell 1998, p. 185): "here, Neo-Kantianism is 
the terminus ad quem of a ' liberation from the unbreakable ci rcle of reflection' toward 
recovery of the 'evocat ive power of conceptual thinking and philosophical language'. It thus 
enters the lore of Continental philosophy as the father who had to be slain in order that 
philosophy might l ive" (ibid.; the quotations stem from Gadamer in his recollections in 
Philosophical Apprenticeships) . 
5 That is, with the exception of the Jewish representatives of Neo-Kantian.ism, such as Cohen 
or Cassirer, who suffered from anti-Semitic attacks throughout their careers. 
b Many a philosophy professor to this day is a caricature of this ideal, or self-consciously 
emulates it, though it has certainly also become the prime target of t.he revolutionary students 
of the 19bOS, when they declared that" Vnter den Talaren, Muff von ti!usend Jahren" (under 
the robes [there is] a thousand-year-old fustiness)' 
7 Edgar 2012. 
8 Cohen also referred to himself as "minister of the exterior" (s ince he liked to travel and 
escape the small university town of Marburg) and Natorp as the "minister of the interior." 
9 Holzhey details this school formation and its activities in Holzhey 198b11 & II. 
10 Religion is conspicuously absent from Cohen's System of Philosophy, although the philosophy 
of religion, especially the philosophical assessment of Judaism, became a dominant part of his 
later work. 
11 Cassirer, who was recruited to the University of Hamburg in 1919, was seen as a representative 
of Neo-Kantianism, and arguably the most important one, as becomes clear in the Davos 
Debate in 1929, but he himself distanced himself somewhat from his Marburg teachers 
philosophically. 
12 This qualification pertains to the philos9~hers of that generation. Certainly, a new crop of 
origina l thinkers emerged, although they did not become famous until much later. I am 
thinking of names such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dieter Henrich and JOrgen Habermas. 
13 Cf. Makkreel, Rudolf and Sebastian Luft, Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy. 
Bloom ington/Indianapolis: I ndiana University Press, 2010. 
14 Cf., however, the 2010 essay col lec ti on edited by Makkreel and Luft, and the new essay 
collection, dealing directly with this legacy, edited by Staiti and De Warren (forthcoming). 
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i5 Husserl had Edith Stein as his assistant for some time and also other female students who wrote 
their dissertations under him. He discouraged them, however, from pursuing a u~iversjty career. 
In the case of Stein, he blocked her habilitation, the traditional entry gate to an academic 
career, in Gottingen, and wrote a negative letter when she applied elsewhere. For a .Iist of 
female phenomenologists, cf. the page of the North American Society for Early Phenomenology, 
http://nasepb/og. wordpress.comJ20 1410310Blthe-women-early-phenomenologyl. 
16 The help I received from other scholars is credited visibly at the outset of each reading. 
17 A new translation of Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (all three volumes) is in the 
works, to be published by Routledge (translated by Stephen Lofts). 
